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What factors shape environmental policies across Europe? In order to answer this question 
most economists would probably adopt a Public Choice approach. This approach has 
explained some aspects of environmental policies that exist in a similar fashion across Europe 
convincingly. But why do many environmental policies differ across European countries? 
This article argues that in order to understand differences in environmental policies in Europe 
North’s analysis on institutions and institutional change is useful. It demonstrates the 
relevance of North’s approach with a case study: the implementation of the EU’s Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The starting point 
of the analysis is the observation that participation of companies in the scheme markedly 
differs between countries. It is shown that in order to understand these differences it is 
necessary to take into account some key concepts of North’s institutional analysis, namely, 
differences in informal institutions, incomplete information of relevant actors, and path 
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1. Introduction 
What factors shape environmental policies across Europe? In order to answer this question 
most economists would probably adopt a Public Choice approach. Typically, they would 
identify the different (groups of) actors which are engaged in environmental policy making, 
ask for their interest in the different policy options that could be applied, analyse the options 
that exists for them to advance their interests, and derive conclusions regarding environmental 
policy outcomes (e.g. Hansjürgens 2000, Schneider and Kirchgässner 2003). There is a 
substantial amount of studies that use the Public Choice approach to explain environmental 
policy outcomes, including some work that addresses environmental policy making in a 
European context. Examples of this work are Svendsen (2005) and Markussen and Svendsen 
(2005) who analyse how lobbyism influenced the design of the EU greenhouse emissions 
trading scheme and Glachant (2002) who uses a political economy analysis to explain why 
water effluent charges in France are comparatively low.  
This research has contributed significantly to our understanding of the evolution and 
implementation of environmental policies. In particular, it has explained phenomena that exist 
in similar fashion across Europe convincingly. One prominent example is the only recently 
changing dominance of command and control policies over market based instruments, which 
is explained by the strong interest of dominant actors in such a policy (cf. Schneider and 
Kirchgässner 2003). From a Public Choice perspective the similarity of policies is not 
surprising because given similar interests of well-informed actors and similar options for 
action the outcome should be similar, too.  
But why do many environmental policies differ across European countries? This article 
argues that in order to understand differences in environmental policies in Europe North’s 
analysis on institutions and institutional change is useful (North 1990). According to North an 
analysis of institutional differences across societies requires correcting the rational actor 
model applied in most Public Choice studies. This model is based on the assumption that 
actors possess full information, are consequently able to identify all available options for 
action and choose the best alternative. North argues that economists should take into account 
instead that actors frequently must act on incomplete information, and that informal 
institutions such as conventions, norms and self-enforced codes of conduct differ among 
actors. Furthermore, informal institutions and incomplete information may lead to self-
reinforcing dynamics which implies that institutional change is typically path-dependant.  
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North’s approach has received considerable attention in economics, and has been used to 
analyse many policy areas. However, few authors applied North’s approach to explain 
environmental policy outcomes. Exceptions include Hansjürgens (2000) who explains 
differences in German and US environmental policy with cultural differences, Söderholm 
(2001) who finds that a fundamental difficulty in implementing effective pollution charges in 
Russia is the enterprise tradition and behaviour inherited from the Communist past, and 
Woerdman (2004) who analyses institutional barriers (including informal institutions) to 
implementing market-based climate policy.  
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the relevance of North’s approach to explain differences 
in environmental policy making and implementation in Europe through a case study. The case 
study deals with European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (Council Regulation 
1836/93 of 29 June 1993, in short EMAS) and its implementation in three Member States 
(Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK) until the year 2000
1. The striking feature of the 
EMAS implementation process is that participation of companies in EMAS markedly differs 
between the three countries with EMAS participation high in Germany and low in the 
Netherlands and the UK. It will be shown below that this difference cannot be satisfactorily 
explained within the Public Choice framework. Instead, one has to take into account 
incomplete information, differences in mental constructs of relevant actors, and path 
dependence.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section Two provides the analytical background by 
outlining selected aspects of North’s approach to explain institutional change, namely, 
informal institutions, incomplete information and path dependence. Section Three describes 
the evolution of EMAS and provides a short description of its content and of IS014001, an 
environmental management systems standard, which companies may choose as an alternative 
to EMAS. Furthermore, participation figures are given for both standards in the three 
countries under review. In Section Four a first explanation of different participation figures 
based on profit maximisation of companies and different incentives set by the national 
regulators is provided. This explanation, however, leads to the question why the regulators set 
different incentives. This is explained in Section Five by referring to differences in informal 
institutions, incomplete information of relevant actors and path dependence. In Section Six 
further research questions are identified and policy recommendations derived. 
                                                           
1 Knowledge about the case study is based on research from two EU-funded projects and resulting publications. 
Within the ERIC-project (see for an overview Lévêque 1996) the political evolution of EMAS was analysed and 
within the IMPOL-project (see for an overview Glachant 2001) the implementation of EMAS in the Member 
States until 2000.   
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2. Analytical framework 
This section outlines selected parts of North’s approach to explain the evolution and change 
of institutions. The section concentrates on those aspects that are relevant for the explanation 
of institutional differences leading to varying environmental policies across Europe. 
According to North (1990 and 1995) three aspects of human behaviour that are partly 
interlinked are essential to understand differences in institutions and institutional change 
across societies: (I) informal institutions, (II) incomplete information, and (III) path 
dependence. 
(I) North distinguishes between organisations and institutions. In simple words, institutions 
are the rules of the game, organisations, the players. Organisations consist of a group of 
people bound together by some common objective (e.g., firms, NGOs, regulatory bodies). 
Institutions are the constraints that human beings impose on human interaction. North 
distinguishes between formal and informal institutions. The former include legal rules (e.g., 
constitutions, statute law, common law, regulations) and the latter informal constraints such 
as conventions, norms and self-enforced codes of conduct. North emphasises that in 
determining human behaviour informal institutions are as important as formal institutions. 
People make their choices based on their perceptions, which are a function of the way the 
mind interprets the information it receives. The ‘mental constructs’ that individuals form to 
explain and interpret the world around them are a result of their cultural heritage, of the local 
everyday problems they confront, and of non-local learning. This implies that individuals 
from different backgrounds will interpret the same evidence differently and may, in 
consequence, make different choices.  
Applied to European environmental policy this approach draws attention to the fact that the 
policy process that accompanies the formulation of environmental policies at the European 
level is not only influenced by interests but also by different informal institutions of the actors 
coming from the different Member States and the EU Commission. The same applies to the 
implementation of European environmental policies in the Member States and the formulation 
of national policies. The mental constructs of the national regulators and other actors involved 
may significantly differ from one Member State to the next leading to different 
implementation choices. But why do actors in different Member States often not learn from 
each other in order to find the best implementation solution? To answer this question we turn 
to the issue of incomplete information.   
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(II) One of the basic assumptions of Public Choice theory is that human beings identify and 
choose the best option for their action. In contrast, North (1990, 22ff.) argues that this 
requires a high level of knowledge which may – at best – be available for repetitive actions 
and simple circumstances where human beings possess sufficient experience. He emphasises 
that incomplete information and the subjective processing of information often prevents 
human beings from identifying the best course of action. The more complex and unique a 
situation is the less knowledge about possible outcomes is available. This implies that it is 
uncertain that better outcomes are reached. Furthermore, as emphasised above human beings 
process the information they receive through their mental constructs. This may prevent them 
from interpreting the information they receive in a way that they learn about better 
alternatives. As North puts it: ‘Actors would certainly like to improve outcomes, but the 
information feedback may be so poor that the actor cannot identify better alternatives.’ North 
(1990, 24).   
What does incomplete information for unique and complex situations and subjective 
processing of information imply for European environmental policy? We can expect that there 
will be different opinions about the evolution of new and complex policies among actors from 
different countries and the EU Commission that do not only result from different interests but 
also from different information levels. Similarly, we can expect differences in the 
implementation of EU policies in the Member States that, again, cannot be explained by 
different interests alone.  
(III) The existence of informal institutions and incomplete information implies that 
institutional change is typically path-dependant. Path dependence means that policy outcomes 
depend on the (often coincidental) starting point and specific course of a historical decision-
making process. The path dependence approach emphasises self-reinforcing dynamics, so that 
the dominance of a sub-optimal situation
2 in the presence of a superior alternative may persist 
for some time and an evolution to a better alternative does not necessarily occur. One 
essential reason for path dependence is that the perception of human beings of the existing 
institutional framework and the effects of possible efforts for change are based on mental 
constructs and information that are a result of this framework. Both these feedback processes 
and incomplete information on the consequences of an action imply that attempts to change 
the institutional framework do not necessarily lead to an improved situation. A further reason 
for the dominance of a sub-optimal situation may be that the incentive structure provided by 
                                                           
2 For the purpose of this paper and in accordance with Woerdman (2004, p.57) optimality may be defined as 
minimising the cost/benefit ratio of running a process.  
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existing institutions led to the evolution of organisations which depend on the institutions for 
their profitability and viability. The activities that these organisations undertake, their 
complex web of interactions and other relationships are built on the existing institutional 
structure. Changes to these structures may therefore be costly to organisations and, as a 
consequence, opposed by them – an argument which is consistent with the Public Choice 
approach.  
Applying the concept of path dependence to European environmental policy one may observe 
that a sub-optimal situation in Member States persists due to self-reinforcing dynamics 
despite efforts to reach a better situation. These dynamics arise because the existing 
framework determines actors’ mental constructs and leads to the evolution of organisations 
which depend on it for their profit and existence and are therefore opposed to change.  
 
3. Introduction to the EMAS case study 
This section provides background knowledge for the case study, i.e., the application of 
North’s approach to explain why the implementation of EMAS in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK led to different participation rates among companies. The Section starts with a 
brief description of the evolution of EMAS and the positions of relevant actors in the political 
process that preceded the adoption of EMAS. Furthermore, the environmental management 
systems standard of the International Standards Organisation, ISO14001, is briefly 
introduced. It provides an alternative to EMAS for companies, and differences in EMAS 
participation in the Member States may be largely explained by whether companies prefer 
EMAS or ISO14001.  
 
3.1 The evolution of EMAS
3 
European environmental policy was greatly modified in the early 1990s. In recognising the 
limits of traditional command and control policies, the Fifth EU Environmental Action 
Programme adopted in 1992 emphasised broadening the range of policy instruments through 
the use of marked based instruments and flexible, voluntary approaches. In this context the 
plan of an eco-management and audit scheme was developed inside the European 
Commission in 1990.  
                                                           
3 This section is based on Franke and Wätzold (1995), Eames (2000) and Wätzold and Bültmann (2001a).  
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The political process that accompanied the evolution of EMAS can be divided into two main 
phases. The first phase began with the release of a consultation document on EMAS by the 
Commission in late 1990. European industry was united in its rejection of the proposal and 
strongly criticised the mandatory nature of the proposed scheme. Confronted with industry’s 
strong resistance, the Commission decided to adopt a voluntary approach.  
The second phase began with the publication of a Commission proposal for a voluntary 
EMAS. Industry’s response now differed in two ways. First, with the exception of German 
companies industry kept a lower profile on the matter than it did at the first stage, and, 
second, industry’s response was divided. While the German industry supported by the 
government continued to oppose the scheme the attitude of industry and governments from 
other Member States was mostly supportive.  
One important reason why German industry and government continued to oppose EMAS was 
that their approach towards environmental problems was different from that of EMAS. EMAS 
is management oriented. The idea of EMAS is to improve a company’s environmental 
performance by establishing a good environmental management system and then have it 
audited. The approach of German industry was engineer driven and technology oriented. In 
order to improve its environmental performance a typical German company developed or 
purchased an improved environmental technology and implemented it. Similarly, in order to 
tackle an environmental problem the German regulator would implement or tighten a standard 
based on the “best available technology”. The EMAS culture was therefore alien to German 
companies and regulators, and both groups could not see any benefits from EMAS. In 
addition, companies feared costs as they expected to be forced to take part in the scheme due 
to high public pressure in environmental matters in Germany at that time.  
In contrast, the UK and the Dutch government were active supporters of EMAS. A 
management based approach to environmental problems was in line with the culture of UK 
industry. The UK was the first country to develop an environmental management systems 
standard, the BS (British Standard) 7750, and a significant number of companies were 
working to implement this standard. The UK conservative government saw environmental 
management schemes as an adequate instrument to promote voluntary environmental action 
by industry as part of its wider deregulatory and market-oriented philosophy. Similar to their 
UK counterparts, a significant number of Dutch companies had gathered considerable 
experience with environmental management systems, many of them using BS 7750.  
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Furthermore, the Dutch government and industry considered environmental management 
systems to play an important role in deregulation efforts in environmental policy.  
In late 1992 it became obvious that all Member States except Germany were in favour of the 
regulation. As the final ratification of the Maastricht treaty would enable EMAS to be ratified 
with majority voting Germany gave in to the pressure of the other Member States and EMAS 
was adopted at the Environmental Council Meeting in June 1993. The striking feature of the 
policy process that preceded the EMAS regulation was that the different positions between 
Germany and the other Member States were largely a result of their hitherto different 
approaches on how to improve companies’ environmental performance. As a representative of 
the German chemical industry in Bruxelles interviewed by the author in 1994 pointed out 
bluntly: “German companies did not understand what EMAS was about”. In terms of North’s 
approach; German actors had formed different “mental constructs” in terms of how to 
successfully improve companies’ environmental performance than their Dutch and UK 
counterparts. Consequently, this influenced their behaviour in the policy process preceding 
the adoption of EMAS.  
 
3.2 Companies’ alternatives: EMAS and ISO14001  
Almost parallel to the formulation of EMAS, the ISO (International Standards Organisation) 
prepared an international standard for an environmental management system. Preparations 
had begun against the background that a number of national organisations had already 
launched their own standards such as BS7750. The international environmental management 
system standard, ISO14001, was finally launched in September 1996.  
EMAS and ISO14001 are based on the same principle. Both are environmental management 
system standards which define certain requirements that an environmental management 
system of a company ought to meet. These are in essence procedural requirements as opposed 
to commitments setting specified levels of environmental performance. Once a company 
meets these requirements it may apply to external bodies for certification (ISO14001) or 
registration (EMAS). Once certified or registered the company can use this recognition for its 
external or internal communication. One main difference between the two standards is that 
EMAS requires in addition to an environmental management system a validated 
environmental statement to inform the public. Next to this difference, EMAS is formally 
slightly more demanding for companies. E.g., in contrast to registration under EMAS, legal 
compliance is not a necessary condition for ISO14001 certification. Despite these differences  
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significant similarities exist between both standards, which imply that ISO14001 provides for 
companies an alternative to EMAS
4. In order to understand participation rates in EMAS, it is, 
therefore, necessary to look at ISO14001 participation, as well.  
The different positions of German, UK and Dutch industry and government in the policy 
process that preceded the adoption of EMAS might one lead to expect that participation rates 
in EMAS reflect these different opinions with the UK and the Netherlands being far ahead of 
Germany in terms of participation numbers. This expectation, however, was proven wrong. 
Table 1 shows the absolute participation rates in EMAS and ISO 14001 in the three countries 
in 2000, five years after EMAS came into force. In order to take into account that the 
countries’ economies differ in size and structure the relative participation figures are also 
presented which are gained by dividing the participation figures with the number of potential 
participants.  
 
Table 1: EMAS and ISO14001 participation rates in April 2000 
  EMAS ISO14001 
 No.  of 
registered sites 
In % of 
potential 
participants* 
No. of certified 
organisations 
In % of 
potential 
participants 
Germany 2,432  6.50  1,950  5.21 
Netherlands 26 0.41  606  9.46 
UK 73  0.25  1,014  3.42 
* Companies from the manufacturing sector with more than 20 employees are taken as a 
proxy for potential participants 
Source: Wätzold and Bültmann (2001a, p.141), modified 
The striking feature about EMAS participation is the comparatively high participation rate in 
Germany and the low participation rates in the Netherlands and the UK. Participation rates in 
ISO14001 are more comparable ranging from 3.42% in the UK to 9.46% in the Netherlands. 
Germany is the only country with more EMAS than ISO14001 participants whereas 
participation in ISO14001 is more than ten times higher than participation in EMAS in the 
                                                           
4 A description of EMAS and ISO14001 can be found in, e.g., Wätzold et al. (2001) and Wätzold and Bültmann  
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UK and even more than twenty times higher in the Netherlands. How can these differences in 
the participation rates been explained? 
 
4. A first explanation of national differences in EMAS and ISO14001 participation  
A first explanation based on different companies’ benefits resulting from EMAS and 
ISO14001 participation is given by Glachant et al. (2002). However, different benefits are 
mainly a result from incentives set by the regulator, and at the end of this Section the question 
remains: Why did the regulator set different incentives? Glachant et al. (2002) start from the 
assumption that as participation in environmental management systems is voluntary, 
companies only decide to participate if the benefits related to such a system exceed the 
participation costs. If net benefits are positive for both standards companies chose the 
standard that generates the highest net benefits. In order to evaluate the potential net benefits 
from participation Glachant et al. identify several key factors that influence them: Benefits 
and costs of implementing an environmental management system, benefits and costs related 
to image gains arising from participation in EMAS or ISO14001, cost reductions through 
public subsidies that participating companies might receive and benefits from regulatory relief 
for EMAS registered or ISO14001 certified companies.  
Companies derive direct benefits from implementing an environmental management system 
mainly because such a system systematically detects cost-saving opportunities such as saving 
of water, energy and waste (cf. Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998) and Wätzold and 
Bültmann (2001a)). For EMAS and ISO14001 benefits and costs related to the 
implementation of such a system are similar.
 Companies from all three countries under review 
cited cost-savings as the main reason for their participation. Especially German companies 
benefited from the advantages brought about by the implementation of an environmental 
management system because these companies had hitherto neglected environmental 
management issues. Ironically, the German technology oriented approach which had initially 
led German industry to reject EMAS was now one of the reasons for the success of 
environmental management systems in Germany.  
Potentially, there may be a wide number of benefits from image gains for companies that 
participate in EMAS or ISO14001 such as positive reactions among the general public and 
preferential treatment by clients. EMAS participants may gain image benefits from the 
certificate of participation and the environmental statement. They are, however, limited to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2001a).  
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Europe. ISO 14001 is an international standard, but ISO14001 participants only receive the 
certificate of participation. Most German and Dutch companies considered the advantage of 
the environmental statement as limited with some having even been disappointed about the 
communication effect. UK companies sometimes completely rejected the idea of giving the 
public information about their environmental performance.  
Looking only at the costs and benefits related to image and implementing an environmental 
management system it can easily be explained why UK and Dutch companies prefered 
ISO14001 over EMAS. ISO14001 is an internationally recognised standard whereas EMAS is 
only European and ISO14001 is less costly because it does not require an environmental 
statement. The environmental statement in turn generates on average only little benefits. But 
why was EMAS in Germany more popular than ISO14001? Glachant et al. answered this 
question by comparing the influence of the two remaining factors that determine a company’s 
net participation benefit in EMAS and ISO14001 in the three countries. These factors – 
subsidies and regulatory relief – are influenced by the regulator.
5  
In Germany, financial support for implementing an environmental management system was 
mainly granted in the form of financial subsidies. It was estimated that by 2000 between 30% 
and 60% of all EMAS participants had received financial support and that the average subsidy 
had been approximately 38,000 DM (=20,000€) (Wätzold and Bültmann 2001b, Glachant et 
al. 2002). Subsidies for EMAS participation were available in all German federal states 
whereas subsidies for ISO14001 participation existed only in a few states and were lower. 
Regulatory relief was granted to EMAS participants in several federal states but not to 
ISO14001 participants. The extent of regulatory relief differed among the states with Bavaria 
adopting the most far-reaching approach, where EMAS participation and regulatory relief 
were integrated in a voluntary agreement between industry and the Bavarian Government (see 
for details Wätzold et al. 2001).  
There were no regular subsidies in the Netherlands for implementing an environmental 
management system but in 1989, the Dutch government had financed a 60 million Dutch 
guilders learning programme. The purpose of the programme was to stimulate the 
implementation of environmental management systems in companies and included the 
development of checklists, handbooks and training measures. Since the early 1990s, 
regulatory relief was granted to pro-active companies that internalise environmental values 
into their organisations. A certified environmental management system was considered a  
  13
necessary precondition to convince the authorities that a company is pro-active and can be 
treated differently from a “laggard” as far as monitoring, enforcement and licensing is 
concerned. The government considered participation in EMAS and ISO 14001 as equal signs 
that a company is pro-active.  
The higher number of companies with a certified environmental management system in the 
Netherlands compared to the UK may be explained with the fact that regulatory relief for 
EMAS and ISO14001 participants was basically non-existent in the UK. Furthermore, apart 
from pilot studies no subsidies were available to support the participation of firms in 
ISO14001. There was only a programme to support EMAS participation which was addressed 
particularly at the participation of small and medium sized companies. The programme was 
abolished after one and a half years due to the poor uptake. The Government did not indicate 
to companies that it considered EMAS superior over ISO14001. 
Taking into account subsidies and regulatory relief it can be explained why EMAS was more 
popular among German companies than ISO14001. The reason is that – in contrast to the UK 
and the Netherlands – the incentives set by the regulator in relation to subsidies and 
regulatory relief made EMAS for many companies more attractive than ISO14001. However, 
this finding leads to another question (Glachant et al. 2002, p.265). Why did the German 
regulator have such clear preferences for EMAS and the regulators in the other countries did 
not? The next section answers this question by applying North’s approach to the case study.  
 
5. Relevance of informal institutions, incomplete information and path dependence  
In order to explain why the German regulator preferred EMAS to ISO14001 and the other 
regulators treated both standards as equal the analysis now focuses on differences in informal 




5.1 UK: Environmental management systems as a mean for voluntary action by industry 
In the UK, the government was committed to a market-oriented approach towards 
environmental problems with comparatively little government influence; it considered 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 A justification why the regulator may grant regulatory relief to companies is given in Wätzold et al. (2001) and 
why the regulator may subsidise companies in Wätzold and Bültmann (2001b).  
6 The information about the policies in the three countries presented in this chapter is taken from Wätzold and 
Bültmann (2001a, chapter 3).  
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environmental management systems a suitable means for voluntary action by industry. 
Furthermore, the government was aware that environmental management systems were in line 
with the management-oriented attitudes of UK firms towards environmental problems. In the 
presence of such informal institutions on how to tackle environmental problems there was no 
reason why the UK government should prefer EMAS to ISO14001. Due to the development 
of BS7750 and its subsequent influence on EMAS and ISO14001, there was a high level of 
information about environmental management systems in the UK. This information, however, 
did not alter the government’s opinion about treating EMAS and ISO14001 as equal. For the 
government the overall philosophy of environmental management systems was more 
important than differences regarding details.  
 
5.2 Netherlands: Environmental management systems as a tool for deregulation 
In the Netherlands the early 1980s were a period of little economic growth and government 
believed that over-regulation was one of the reasons. Subsequent deregulation efforts also 
included environmental policies, which hitherto had been dominated by a command and 
control approach. Industry perceived environmental management systems as one suitable tool 
for deregulation in the field of environmental regulation. Although the government was 
interested in environmental management systems it demanded that they should be 
trustworthy, uniform and of high standard. In order to reach that goal industry accepted some 
government involvement in standardisation and – once standards were developed – in 
certification of companies. To reach uniform and high quality standards it was decided to 
harmonise the requirements for certification with ISO14001 and EMAS registration. This 
implies that the Dutch NEN ISO14001 is slightly more demanding for companies than the 
original ISO14001. The only substantial requirement of EMAS on top of ISO14001 is the 
publication of a validated environmental statement. Similar to the UK, government and 
industry in the Netherlands had gathered significant experience with environmental 
management systems, and it can be assumed that they were well informed when making 
decisions.  
Obviously, informal institutions in the Netherlands were different from those in the UK 
despite the fact that both countries treated EMAS and ISO14001 as equal in terms of 
subsidies and regulatory relief. While at the period under review the UK had a rather laissez-
faire and market-based approach towards environmental policy the Dutch tradition was 
largely one of command and control. Strict regulation had brought the Netherlands significant  
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environmental improvements but was also considered as becoming too much of a burden to 
the economy. Therefore, regulation was considered as having benefits but being in need of 
modification in order to give industry more flexibility. From this perspective it was clear that 
governments should be involved in developing and implementing environmental management 
systems and that these should have a high standard. Given that in the Netherlands EMAS and 
ISO14001 were equally demanding, except that EMAS required an environmental statement 
in addition, there was no reason for the Dutch Government to prefer EMAS to ISO14001. 
 
5.3 Germany: EMAS as the first environmental management system standard 
The situation in Germany in terms of informal institutions and the level of information about 
environmental management systems was markedly different from the two other countries. 
Until the early 1990s, the technology oriented approach was the dominant response against 
environmental problems in Germany, and when EMAS evolved in the early 1990s, 
environmental management systems were considered a useless and costly addition to 
industry’s technology based efforts. However, EMAS could not be neglected, as legal 
requirements demanded the development of national institutions and organisations
7 to 
implement EMAS in the Member States. The process accompanying the design and 
implementation of these organisations and institutions was in two ways responsible for the 
increasing popularity of EMAS in Germany in the period under review.  
First, government and industry had to acquaint themselves with EMAS more intensely. An 
overall learning process about EMAS started and pilot studies revealed that cost-savings and 
environmental improvements could be achieved at the same time. Because German 
companies had hitherto neglected the importance of environmental management systems, they 
now greatly benefitted from EMAS participation. The German technology oriented approach, 
which had initially led German companies to reject EMAS, was now one of the reasons for its 
success.   
Secondly, there was a conflict about the design of institutions and organisations required for 
the implementation of EMAS in Germany. Industry, supported by the Ministry of Economics, 
argued for a system dominated by industry whereas environmental groups, supported by the 
Ministry of the Environment, pleaded for a system with strong state involvement. The 
                                                           
7 As an EU-Regulation EMAS is directly binding in the Member States. However, to make EMAS fully 
operational the Member States had to establish a system for the accreditation and supervision of independent 
environmental verifiers and to appoint a competent body for the registration of the companies participating in 
EMAS.  
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government realised that a system based on voluntary participation from companies requires 
the support of the industry, and a compromise was reached where the system is organised and 
run by industry with the state retaining only some control functions. E.g., responsibility for 
the registration of companies was placed on the local Chambers of Industry and Commerce 
and the Chambers of Craft. However, the registration procedure requires the Chambers to 
inform the enforcement bodies and to give them the opportunity to intervene should the 
company not comply with environmental legislation. As the compromise largely followed the 
demands of industry, industrial bodies felt that they were responsible for the success of 
EMAS in Germany and lobbied for companies’ participation.  
Before the adoption of EMAS at the European level there was little information about 
environmental management systems in Germany. The level of information significantly 
increased in the course of the EMAS implementation process. However, there was a marked 
difference between Germany and the other two countries. In the Netherlands and the UK 
learning had focused on the development of environmental management systems in general, 
whereas in Germany it focussed on EMAS. This implied that in Germany knowledge about 
ISO14001 was not available to the same extent as in the other countries, especially on the side 
of the regulator.   
Given the lack of knowledge about ISO14001 and the fact that government still had some 
influence in the EMAS system compared to none in the ISO14001 scheme it is not surprising 
that government gave preferential treatment to EMAS participants with regard to subsidies 
and regulatory relief. Furthermore, due to its formally higher requirements many government 
officials felt that EMAS was a better choice in terms of environmental improvements.  
Once EMAS had been implemented in Germany and become a popular system self-
reinforcing dynamics that led to path dependence could be observed. First, the formal and 
informal institutions focussed the attention of actors on EMAS. As experience with EMAS 
was good, there was a positive feedback that encouraged more companies to participate in 
EMAS, further reinforcing the positive response. In such a situation – actors are not fully 
informed about the consequences of all alternatives and improvements compared to the Status 
Quo are being made – it is difficult for other even more positive alternatives to receive 
sufficient attention and, hence, they are often not realized.  
Second, industrial bodies in general had an interest in the success of EMAS because of their 
involvement in the scheme and possible reputation losses. It would have strengthened the 
supporters of strict environmental legislation if a system to improve companies’  
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environmental performance failed where industry voluntarily carried responsibility. 
Particularly, the local Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Craft had an interest in a 
high number of EMAS participants. The staff from these bodies employed for informing 
companies about EMAS and the registration of EMAS participants had to finance their work 
through the fees companies paid for their EMAS registration.  
After having explained why the German regulator preferred EMAS to ISO14001 the question 
arises whether this choice is sub-optimal. From the point of view of environmental economic 
analysis giving higher (or exclusively) subsidies to EMAS participants is justified if EMAS 
leads to a significantly better environmental performance of companies than ISO14001 
(Wätzold and Bültmann 2001b). However, it seems that companies improve their 
environmental performance mainly because of implementing an environmental management 
system (cf. Section 3.3). These systems are very similar for both schemes, which suggests that 
EMAS does not lead to more improvements than ISO14001. On an empirical level, this view 
is supported by existing studies that compare environmental benefits of EMAS and ISO14001 
and do not find that participation in EMAS leads to a better environmental performance than 
participation in ISO14001 (cf. Wätzold and Bültmann 2001b).  
Regarding regulatory relief it needs to be noted that EMAS is slightly more demanding in 
terms of requirements for improving legal compliance. One may argue that this leads to a 
higher level of compliance and hence justifies giving preferential treatment to EMAS 
participants in terms of regulatory relief. However, as pointed out in Section Four, companies 
derive higher net benefits from ISO14001 because participation costs are lower and it is an 
international standard. Giving EMAS preferential treatment, therefore, leads to higher costs 
and, respectively, foregone benefits for EMAS participants. With harmonizing the 
requirements for ISO14001 certification and EMAS registration the Dutch found an 
alternative to avoid these disadvantages while ensuring that ISO14001 certification leads to 
improvements of company’s legal compliance equal to that of EMAS. Overall, we can 
therefore conclude that the German approach to EMAS and ISO14001 in terms of subsidies 
and regulatory relief is likely a sub-optimal choice.   
 
6. Summary and Discussion  
Public Choice is the dominant approach in economics to explain environmental policy 
outcomes. It has – inter alia – convincingly explained that environmental policy outcomes 
exist in a similar fashion across Europe. But why do different policies also exist? The aim of  
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this paper is to demonstrate by way of a case study that North’s approach in explaining 
institutional change may be important in understanding differences in environmental policy 
across Europe. The case study deals with European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme and its implementation in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. It has been shown 
that the high number of EMAS-participants in Germany and the low number in the 
Netherlands and the UK may be explained with different informal institutions, different levels 
of information and path dependence.  
This result calls for more research in order to understand the importance of North’s approach 
in explaining the evolution and implementation of environmental policies in general and in 
Europe in particular. Further research may address the question for what type of 
environmental policies, actor constellations or political and economic circumstances North’s 
analysis of institutional change is relevant – and for what type, the Public Choice approach. 
The case study presented in this paper suggests that for novel and complex policies – like 
environmental management systems in the early 1990s – North’s approach is likely to be 
important. For such policies the level of information may substantially differ between relevant 
actors or be low in general. Given different informal institutions such policies, therefore, may 
be particularly prone for varying interpretations.  
The case study demonstrated that path dependence matters. It was possible to identify 
feedback-processes related to incomplete information reinforcing the existing – most likely 
sub-optimal – policy path. Furthermore, the existing institutions created organisations that 
depended on it for reasons of reputation and profitability and, hence, had an interest in their 
existence. However, institutions do change. This leads to the questions of what factors lead to 
a change of institutions from a particular path or as Woerdman put it to an institutional break-
out. Further research in this field may be beneficial to understand the factors behind policy 
changes away from a particular path. 
Obviously, North’s approach helps to improve our understanding of environmental policy 
outcomes. However, in contrast to Public Choice, predicting environmental policy outcomes 
is difficult. Applying a Public Choice approach, i.e., identifying the relevant actors, their 
interests in the different potential environmental policies, and their options to further their 
interests, makes testable predictions about environmental policy outcomes possible. This 
seems much more difficult when considering informal institutions and incomplete 
information. For purpose of illustration consider the case study again: Who would have 
predicted in the early 1990s – and on what grounds – that, given the informal institutions in  
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Germany regarding technology oriented environmental policy, there would be so many 
German and so few UK and Dutch EMAS participants? On a more generic level, questions 
such as how relevant actors would behave in the presence of particular – to be properly 
identified – informal institutions and how an increase in information would alter their 
behaviour are difficult to answer. 
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